








PIERI  Working paper 
2011-18  
 
BEYOND CASH: ASSESSING 
EXTERNALITY AND BEHAVIOUR 
EFFECTS OF NON-EXPERIMENTAL 
CASH TRANSFERS 
 
Rafael Perez Ribas 
Email:rpribas.rs@gmail.com  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Fábio Veras Soares 
Email:fabio.veras@ipc-undp.org ; fvsoares@yahoo.com 
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 
Clarissa Teixeira 
Email: clarissa.teixeira@ipc-undp.org 
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth 
Elydia Silva 
Email: elydiasilva@gmail.com 
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) 
Guilherme Hirata 
Email:ghirata@gmail.com 





October 2011  
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we propose a method to estimate externality effects in cash transfer programmes, 
even in cases when the benefit is not randomly assigned. Externality is assessed through the 
decomposition of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) into participation (direct) 
effect and externality (indirect) effect. We also suggest a nonparametric decomposition to 
investigate whether changes in household outcomes are caused by the income transfer itself or 
by the other non-monetary components of the programme, such as conditionalities and family 
support services. We apply all these decompositions on the effect of a conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) programme on household consumption and savings in Paraguay. This was possible 
because of the presence of two distinct comparison groups, one within the village and potentially 
exposed to the externality, and another in a different village not affected by the programme. 
Furthermore, the evaluation survey collected information on both income and consumption. The 
results indicate that the programme has a small impact on consumption and a considerable 
impact on savings. In the absence of externality, however, the programme would have a higher 
effect on consumption, mostly associated with the cash transfer, and a lower effect on savings. 
Moreover, the impact on the pattern of consumption is significantly related to a substitution effect 
and is not related to the increase in income. 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid 1990s, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become quite popular 
among policymakers and policy advisers as effective and efficient means of reducing poverty in 
developing countries, mainly in Latin America. Currently, most countries in the region have 
some sort of CCT programme, including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Peru, 
Paraguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and 
Costa Rica. 
These programmes aim to alleviate poverty in the short run through the cash transfer, and to 
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by fostering the accumulation of human 
capital. Hence they are based not only on income distribution but also on certain actions that 
households are required to take in order to receive the transfer. These actions, known as 
conditionalities or co-responsibilities, are usually related to children’s attendance at school, 
regular visits to health centres by pregnant women and children, and the updating of 
immunisation cards. Some programmes also include family support initiatives that seek to 
promote autonomous income generation on the part of beneficiary households, as well as their 
social participation. Therefore, these programmes intend to reduce poverty not only by increasing 
household income but also by changing the behaviour of poor families. 
Impact evaluations of CCT programmes in Latin America have revealed positive results in 
several dimensions.
1  Because of the way in which these evaluations are designed, however 
(even experimental assessments such as those undertaken for PROGRESA in Mexico
2 and the 
Red de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua), one cannot disentangle in any simple way what 
can be attributed to the effect of the transfer itself and what is due to behavioural changes linked 
to the conditionalities, as well as to other programme components. Additionally, few studies have 
examined the externalities of CCT programmes. Externalities are likely to be present in such 
contexts because of the learning processes fostered by social interactions between beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries, and because of general equilibrium effects that influence local prices. 
Understanding the impact of the conditionalities and the existence of externalities is an 
important step in reaching a better assessment of the black-box results of standard impact 
evaluations, and in providing policymakers with better information on the adequacy of their CCT 
programmes. Handa et al. (2009) mention that programme components such as conditionalities, 
which do not have a significant effect, may entail unnecessary costs,
3  whereas Lalive and 
Cattaneo (2009) point out that if there are externalities, the targeting of programmes matters for 
their effect. 
This paper puts forward a methodology that aims to address both the estimation of 
externality effects and the full decomposition of the programme’s impact into income effect and 
behavioural-change effect for cases where an experimental design is not necessarily available. 
The externality effect is basically handled with a multiple-treatment approach, like those proposed 
by Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001), and Hudgens and Halloran (2008).
4 The decomposition of the 
average treatment effect is based on a semi-parametric approach, as in DiNardo et al. (1996), 
which avoids misunderstandings caused by some kind of linearity. In particular, and in contrast to 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004), Rubalcava et al. (2004), Gitter and Barham (2007), and Handa et 
                                                 
1. See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) and Soares et al. (2010) for a review of several impact evaluations   
of CCT programmes. 
2. PROGRESA is now called Oportunidades. 
3. Caldes et al. (2006) estimate that 18 per cent of PROGRESA’s administrative cost and 2 per cent of total programme 
cost are due to monitoring conditionality. Moreover, Molyneux (2007) argues that conditionalities also impose indirect 
costs on beneficiary households, and these costs are eventually paid by mothers more than by other household members. 
4. See Flores and Mitnik (2009) for a discussion on the consistency of these multiple treatment estimators.  
al. (2009), the income expansion path is estimated nonparametrically and it guarantees that the 
identified behavioural-change effect does not come from the change in household income. 
The data are from a household survey designed for the impact evaluation of the pilot phase 
of the Tekoporã  programme in Paraguay. In addition, we used data from the programme’s 
administrative records, which include the payment accounts, and from the Ficha Hogar, a small 
questionnaire used to gather information for the purposes of selecting beneficiary households. 
Using all  these data we estimate the effect of Tekoporã  on households’ consumption and 
savings. 
All the estimates and decompositions in this paper are made for the parameter of average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It is worth mentioning that our methodology can be applied 
to both experimental and quasi-experimental designs, but the meaning of externality and the 
interpretation of the ATT estimates vary according to the comparison group being used. 
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), for instance, analyse the externality effect only on households 
that are not eligible to participate in PROGRESA. It is plausible, however, that externalities can 
also affect treated households. Thus, even when all households are covered by the programme, 
there is some externality that can either boost or attenuate its expected impact. 
For this reason, we decompose the ATT into two components: the average participation 
effect on the treated (APT) and the average externality effect on the treated (AET). We also 
decompose each of these effects into three components: income effect, substitution effect, and 
unexplained effect. That is, changes in consumption can arise from changes in household 
income, marginal propensity to consume, or idiosyncratic autonomous consumption. The 
combination of the latter two effects can be regarded as a behavioural effect.
5 
The results point to the presence of programme externalities within communities. If there 
were no interaction between households, the programme would increase treated households’ 
consumption by 21 per cent and their savings by 31 per cent. These direct effects of participation 
are found to be strictly associated with the rise in income generated by the transfers. That is, an 
unconditional transfer would cause the same increase in household consumption and savings as 
the programme did. However, the indirect impact caused by externality attenuates the direct 
impact on consumption and boosts the direct impact on savings. Moreover, these indirect effects 
are entirely associated with changes in household behaviour according to our proposed 
decomposition. Finally, the income component of the programme has no effect on the 
consumption composition of treated household. Hence an unconditional transfer might not be 
effective in changing the consumption pattern of poor households. 
Besides this introduction, this paper contains five other sections. The second section 
presents a brief review of the literature. The third describes the main features of Tekoporã and 
the sampling design of its evaluation, emphasising how the comparison groups are defined. The 
fourth section puts forward the methodology used to decompose the ATT into participation effect 
and externality effect, as well as the decomposition into income and behavioural-change effects. 
The fifth section presents the main results in terms of household consumption and savings. The 
sixth section presents the conclusions. 
                                                 
5. In this paper, household behaviour is considered  as collective behaviour derived from aggregate outcomes.   
That is, the behavioural change of households represents not only changes in the individual behaviour   
of their members but also changes in the intra-household bargaining.    
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2- WHY MIGHT THE EFFECT OF CCT PROGRAMMES GO BEYOND 
INCOME TRANSFER? 
The main difference between unconditional and conditional cash transfer programmes is that 
the former only seek to relax poor households’ budget constraint, while the latter also seek to 
change the households’ behaviour in terms of budget and time allocations.  
That is, while it is expected that unconditional programmes only have an income effect on the 
outcome of interest, one may expect that conditional programmes have both an income effect 
and a substitution effect; the sum of these two effects gives the total effect of the programme.
6 
Thus it should be expected that the conditional transfer is not like other ordinary incomes, 
having a distinct effect on household decisions. 
Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004), for instance, state that the income effect itself explains about 
50 per cent of the total positive impact on consumption found in the PROGRESA evaluation. The 
remaining impact might be attributed to one of the conditionalities of the programme: attendance 
at talks on health issues (pláticas).
7 They also show that PROGRESA had a positive externality 
effect on non-beneficiaries’ acquisition of calories from fruits, vegetables and animal products. 
Then they speculate that the information provided by pláticas may have spilled over to non-
beneficiaries. 
Like Hoddinott and Skoufias in Mexico, Attanasio and Mesnard (2006), Maluccio and Flores 
(2005), Schady (2006) and Oliveira et al. (2007) show that CCT programmes have changed the 
consumption basket of households in Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Brazil, respectively. In 
Colombia and Nicaragua, Attanasio and Mesnard, and Maluccio and Flores, find that the food 
consumption of beneficiary households grew as much as their aggregate consumption, which 
may be more than the Engel curve predicts. On the basis of results obtained by Adato and 
Roopnaraine (2004, apud Maluccio and Flores, 2005), Maluccio and Flores presume that part of 
the impact of RPS on food consumption stems from the fact that some community agents 
(promotoras) frequently ask beneficiaries to show purchase receipts after transfers have been 
made. In Ecuador and Brazil, Schady, and Oliveira et al., show that the programmes have 
affected the expenditure share of households, even though there is no significant impact on 
aggregate level of consumption. 
All this evidence suggests that CCT programmes have had significant impacts on the Engel 
curve of beneficiary households. Specifically, these households have been encouraged by the 
programmes to change their behaviour in terms of consumption patterns. Such evidence may 
distinguish CCT programmes from other types of targeted cash transfers, whose benefit—
according to Case and Deaton (1998) and Edmonds (2002)—is shown to be used like other 
income by households.
8 
Besides those reasons suggested by Hoddinott and Skoufias (the effect of pláticas) and 
Maluccio and Flores (the effect of promotoras), there are some other explanations for the 
behaviour effect of CCT programmes. The first explanation is that these programmes are usually 
female-based, giving preference to the mother to receive the transfer.
9 According to Attanasio 
                                                 
6. For a graphical illustration of household decision, see Handa et al. (2009: 1131). 
7. They also estimate that 69 per cent of the increase in calories from vegetables is due to the platicas,  
while the remaining effect is due to the increasing income. 
8. Examples of effective results promoted by unconditional cash transfers are given by Duflo (2003),   
Agüero et al. (2007), León and Younger (2007), and Paxton and Schady (2007). 
9. This characteristic is based on the evidence that women are more benevolent than men in sharing income with their 
children (Thomas, 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Doss, 2005; Lundberg et al., 1997).  
and Lechene (2002) and Schady and Rosero (2007) respectively, both PROGRESA in Mexico 
and the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) in Ecuador have improved the bargaining position of 
women in beneficiary households, giving them greater capacity to influence decisions on 
expenditures. These authors, along with Rubalcava et al. (2004), show that the programmes 
have consequently changed the households’ consumption pattern toward goods that benefit 
children, since more money is in the hands of women. 
Although Handa et al. (2009) confirm that PROGRESA has improved the bargaining position 
of some women, they do not find that this improvement has a significant effect on household 
consumption. Similarly, Gitter and Barham (2007) do not find evidence that the impact of 
Nicaragua’s RPS on school enrolment and expenditures is driven by the greater power of women 
in their households. They find that the CCT benefit has an effect on schooling which is 
significantly higher than the effect of other earnings. In Mexico, Rubalcava et al. (2004) also show 
that the effect of the CCT benefit on the expenditure shares of education, child clothing and meat 
is significantly higher than the effect of a general income increase. Gitter and Barham, as well as 
Rubalcava et al., suggest that the differentiated elasticity of the CCT benefit derived not only from 
the change in intra-household bargaining power but also from other programme components, 
such as conditionalities and complementary initiatives.
10 
By estimating a similar model, Handa et al. (2009) seem to contradict the findings of 
Rubalcava et al. (2004). Handa et al. show that the PROGRESA benefit has no effect on 
education spending and makes no difference in terms of  child clothing with respect to other 
earnings. Hence they conclude that the PROGRESA transfer is treated as general income by the 
households and its effects would not differ from those of an unconditional transfer. It is worth 
mentioning, however, that there are some critical differences between the models of Handa et al. 
and Rubalcava et al. The former authors use instrumental variables to predict both the per capita 
transfer and per capita income,
11 estimate the effects on expenditure levels, and adopt a linear 
model with constant elasticities. The latter authors are not concerned about any source of 
endogeneity, estimate the effects on expenditure shares, and adopt a non-linear model with a 
flexible spline. Regarding this latter point, Rubalcava et al. actually show that ignoring non-
linearities in the income effect could lead to misleading results. 
To test the role of conditionalities, Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006) compare the effects of 
PROGRESA with PROCAMPO, another cash transfer programme in Mexico that benefits male 
farmers and whose conditionality is linked to agricultural production. They conclude that, on the 
one hand, cash transfers related to production increase food security through productive 
investments and have a higher impact on the probability of households eating meat and fish. On 
the other hand, cash transfers related to human capital investments have the same effect on food 
security, but by means of market purchases, and a higher effect on the probability of consuming 
fruits, vegetables, dairy products and processed foods. 
The most evident and precise testing for the importance of conditionalities on CCT 
programmes is probably that of de Brauw and Hoddinott (2007). They take advantage of the fact 
that some beneficiaries of PROGRESA did not receive the forms needed to monitor their 
children’s attendance at school. Then they show that the absence of monitoring significantly 
reduces the probability of school attendance, particularly in the transition from primary to 
                                                 
10. Examples of complementary initiatives are the PROGRESA’s health talks and family support initiatives like the “family 
guides” in the case of Tekoporã in Paraguay and social workers’ personalised services in Chile Solidario. 
11. Since Handa et al. (2009) do not present the result obtained without using instrumental variables,   
the effect of such variables on the estimation is unknown.    
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secondary school. This result is similar to that obtained by Bourguignon et al. (2003) for Bolsa 
Escola in Brazil. The difference is that Bourguignon et al. adopt an ex-ante impact evaluation 
approach but they also identify a strong effect of conditionality on school attendance, in contrast 
to a muted effect of the transfer on current poverty. Since the conditionality has an effect on 
schooling, it may also affect other allocation decisions within treated households. 
As regards the externalities of CCT programmes, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) present a 
clear result that PROGRESA has had a positive impact on the food consumption of households 
that are ineligible for the programme. This impact, however, is not caused by a higher demand in 
the local economies and a consequent rise in the ineligibles’ earnings. That indirect effect is 
related to risk-sharing promoted by community-level networks. They argue that the programme 
has increased food consumption by means of loans and transfers from eligible to ineligible 
households. Furthermore, Angelucci et al. (2009) explicitly show that this indirect effect on 
consumption is significant only among ineligible households embedded in family networks. 
Bobonis and Finan (2009), Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) shows that PROGRESA has also had 
positive externality effects on respectively school enrolment and attendance. Their hypothesis is 
that externalities are promoted by endogenous peer effects as a result of social interaction 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the case of Bobonis and Finan, the closer the 
child’s household is to the eligibility cut-off point, the higher the peer effect. Lalive and Cattaneo, 
however, highlight that peer effects also affect eligible children, boosting the impact of the 
programme. Moreover, they claim that peer effects arise because parents learn from each other 
about the ability of their children.
12 
Since CCT programmes also have significant impacts on health (Gertler, 2004; Attanasio et 
al., 2005), this might be another source of externality, one that affects the outcome of non-
beneficiary households by reducing epidemics in the population as a whole. Miguel and Kremer 
(2004), for instance, show that deworming treatment reduces worm burdens and then increases 
school attendance among both treated and untreated children in Kenya. Finally, another 
hypothesis for the presence of externalities in CCT programmes is that given the lack of 
understanding about how eligibility is defined, some households may emulate the behaviour of 
the beneficiaries in an attempt to show that they too could qualify for the programme. 
3 - PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION DESIGN 
3.1 THE Pilot of the Tekoporã Programme 
Tekoporã  is a CCT programme that has been scaled up in Paraguay. Like other CCT 
programmes, it was designed in the context of a national strategy to fight poverty, as part of the 
general effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The programme seeks to 
reduce extreme poverty by giving direct cash transfers to poor households with children, and to 
lessen potential future poverty by encouraging investments in human and social capital. The 
transfers are conditional on school attendance, regular visits to health centres and periodic 
immunisations. The programme also includes a family support component that, among other 
objectives, should increase the household’s productive capacity and social participation.
13 
                                                 
12. Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) presents other evidence on positive peer effects of CCT programmes on   
schooling in Colombia. 
13. This family support approach is inspired largely by the “psycho-social support” of Chile Solidario’s Puente component.  
The pilot programme consisted of a monthly transfer to extremely poor families in rural areas 
with children up to the age of 15 and/or a pregnant woman. These households were entitled to a 
benefit of 30,000 guaranies (US$ 6) per child or pregnant woman up to a limit of four children per 
household; this was in addition to a basic transfer of 60,000 guaranies (US$ 12) per month. 
Eligible households could thus receive between 90,000 and 180,000 guaranies per month (US$ 
18 and US$ 36).
14 
The pilot started in 2005, covering about 4,500 households in five districts of two 
departments: Buena Vista and Abai in the Department of Caazapá, and Santa Rosa del Aguaray, 
Lima and Union in the Department of San Pedro. The first payments were made in Buena Vista in 
September 2005. By August 2006, the pilot covered 4,324 beneficiary households in those five 
districts. Tekoporã has been gradually expanded, and reached 15 districts in five departments by 
2009. These districts were selected from a pool of 66 considered to contain the bulk of the 
vulnerable population, according to a scoring index called the Geographical Prioritisation Index 
(IPG), which is composed of both monetary and non-monetary indicators. 
To identify eligible households, a non-monetary quality of life index (ICV) was adopted as the 
targeting tool. Such an approach has been common throughout Latin America, where poverty 
monitoring often relies on a composite index of unsatisfied basic needs. The ICV varies between 
zero and 100 and is composed of variables related to housing conditions; access to public 
services and utilities such as water, electricity, garbage collection and telephone; healthcare and 
insurance; the education of the head of household and spouse; school achievement of children 
aged between six and 24; the occupation of the head of the household; ownership of durable 
goods; and the household’s demographic composition. Unlike the IPG, the ICV does not use any 
monetary variables. 
Households are eligible for the programme if they meet all of the following conditions: (1) 
have children under 15 years of age or pregnant women; (2) live in the priority areas of the 
programme, namely the poorest districts in the country according to the IPG; and (3) have an ICV 
of below 40 points.
15 
3.2 DATABASE 
In the absence of a baseline survey, information on household characteristics before the 
programme started comes from the database originated by Ficha Hogar, which was the 
instrument used to collect information on the variables used to calculate the ICV—the main 
indicator for the selection of beneficiary households. 
In this pilot phase, the Ficha Hogar was fielded through a census in the poorest areas of the 
selected districts, in addition to the poorest areas of two other districts—Moises Bertoni in the 
department of Caazapá, and Tucuati in the department of San Pedro—that did not take part in 
the pilot. Furthermore, potentially eligible households that were not in the poorest areas of the 
districts for the pilot could also be included in the programme registry as a result of the so-called 
“demand process”—namely, on the basis of their demand to have information on their living 
                                                 
14. In 2009, the minimum benefit was 250,000 guaraníes (US$ 50) and the maximum was 290,000 (US$ 58). Currently, 
each benefit consists of: 80,000 guaraníes from the Bono Alimentario (food grant), which is a fixed amount by family; 
35,000 guaraníes for each household member between 0 and  18 years, up to four members; 35,000 guaraníes for 
households with at least one member older than 65 years; 35,000 guaraníes for households with at least one member with 
a disability. 
15. Initially the programme sought to target only households with an ICV  below 25 points, but the realisation  
that the number of predicted beneficiaries was below the expected numbers per district, and because of some complaints 
at the local level, the eligibility threshold was increased to 40 points.    
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conditions provided to the Ficha Hogar. In total, 7,990 households were screened by the census 
and 1,827 by demand. 
The  evaluation  survey went to the field between January and April 2007, based on a 
sample of 1,401 households derived from the Ficha Hogar. The response rate of the survey 
was 78 per cent—that is, 1,089 households were actually interviewed. The questionnaire used in 
the follow-up survey encompassed all the information available in the Ficha Hogar, in order to 
reproduce the baseline information. It also included important questions related to outcome 
indicators that were not covered by the Ficha Hogar—such as consumption and school 
attendance—and it had a module on the beneficiaries’ perception of the programme. 
3.3 COMPARISON group 
In any impact evaluation, the comparison group must be as similar as possible to the 
beneficiary (or treated) group except that it does not participate in the programme. For 
Tekoporã, it was possible to identify two comparison groups: (1) non-beneficiaries living inthe 
other two districts covered by the census (Ficha Hogar) but not by the pilot project; and (2) non-
beneficiaries living in the same five districts as the beneficiaries. Furthermore, both groups of 
households were divided into eligibles (which had children and an ICV below 40) and ineligibles 
(which also had children but with an ICV equal to or greater than 40). Households that did not 
have children or pregnant women were automatically excluded from the dataset, as were those 
households that registered with an incomplete interview.
16 
Table 1 presents the reasons for the non-participation in the programme of the potential 
comparison group in the Ficha Hogar database. The largest group comprises households in the 
two districts not participating in the pilot (39 per cent). In these districts, more than 90 per cent 
(1,160 of 1,284) of the households with children had an ICV below 40. It is worth mentioning that 
those two districts were meant to be included in the pilot, but because of budget constraints the 
programme could only cover five districts. To keep the geographical balance between 
departments, one district from each department was excluded from the pilot. 
The second largest group of non-beneficiaries consists of households that lived in the 
districts of the pilot but were “overlooked” or “forgotten” by the programme (35 per cent). In this 
case, about 66 per cent (542 of 708) were eligible for the programme (ICV below 40). One 
possible reason for this administrative error is related to the change in the cut-off point of the 
eligibility criteria. As the cut-off point was increased from 25 to 40 when registration for the 
programme had already begun, it is possible that in some neighbourhoods, potential beneficiaries 
whose ICV was between 25 and 40 did not receive an invitation to register. 
                                                 
16. About 8 per cent of the households registered in the Ficha Hogar  had an incomplete interview (752 of 9,817). 
Nonetheless, 98 per cent of these cases (736) were registered by demand and 88 per cent (6 from the census   
and 653 by demand) have been treated (Soares and Ribas, 2007).  
TABLE 1 
Reasons for Not Receiving the Treatment 
  EligibleICV<40 %  IneligibleICV>40 %  Total % 
Districts excluded from the pilot  1,160  44.24  124  17.71  1,284 38.65 
Overlooked  776  29.60  398  56.86  1,174 35.34 
Rejected by selection committee
17  542  20.67  166  23.71  708  21.31 
Waiting for landless movement permission   127  4.84  12  1.71  139  4.18 
Graduated due to economic autonomy  17  0.65  0  0.00  17  0.51 
Total  2,622  100.00 700  100.00 3,322 100.00 
Source: Ficha Hogar and payment register of Tekoporã. 
The other reasons provided in Table 1 are related to: (1) rejection by the selection 
committees, whose function was to double-check the list of potential beneficiaries yielded by 
the ICV ranking; (2) potential beneficiaries living in settlements controlled by the landless 
movement, who were waiting for permission from their leaders to take part in the programme; 
and (3) households that were identified as non-poor (because of their degree of economic 
autonomy) in later checks. 
We chose to use the two largest groups of untreated households as our comparison groups 
in this evaluation—that is, households in districts outside the pilot and households overlooked by 
the programme. This allows us to make two types of comparison in the impact estimation: 
“between-district” and “within-district”. The other groups were excluded from the evaluation 
because they were not treated owing to specific unobservable (or hard-to-control-for) reasons. 
Thus it was possible to define four types of comparison groups registered in the dataset. 
These groups consist of eligible and ineligible households in both districts—with and without the 
programme. Note that the districts excluded from the pilot are neither geographically 
concentrated nor distinct from the participating districts. Table 2 confirms that, in general, there 
are no great differences between them. 
TABLE 2 
Socioeconomic Conditions of Districts Screened by the Ficha Hogar 
  Districts   
   In the pilot  Excluded from the pilot Total 
Mean ICV  27.56  29.87  29.39 
% ICV less than 25  52.72  46.57  47.84 
% ICV between 25 and 40  32.71  33.32  33.20 
% ICV between 40 and 55  9.92  11.91  11.50 
% ICV greater than 55  4.66  8.20  7.46 
Mean household income (in Gs)  417,820.80  432,534.00  429,482.10 
Mean per capita income (in Gs)  94,401.44  109,554.10  106,411.10 
% of (monetarily) poor  82.10  81.08  81.29 
% of (monetarily) extremely poor  69.41  70.09  69.95 
Number of observations
*  6,320  1,654  7,974 
Source: Ficha Hogar. 
Note: 
* all households with complete interview in the census. 
                                                 
17. This statistic is overestimated since it includes hundreds of rejections of households that were located in indigenous 
communities that could not take part in the programme as it was designed. A specific programme is due to be designed 
for these communities.    
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4 - METHODOLOGY 
4.1. ESTIMATION Strategy 
In order to measure the programme’s impact on an observable outcome, we need to estimate 
the difference between the outcome with the treatment (participating in the programme) and the 
outcome without the treatment (not participating) for the same household. When these 
differences are calculated for all treated households under the necessary conditions, we can 
obtain the ATT. 
Formally, assume that  1 = i T  indicates that the treatment, or programme benefit, is offered to 
household i and  0 = i T , otherwise. Similarly,  ( ) 0 = i i T Y  would indicate the outcome of interest for 
household  i  when the treatment is not offered, whereas  ( ) 1 = i i T Y   would be the outcome for 
household i receiving the programme benefit. Then, the effect of intention to treat on the treated 
(ITT) can be defined as (Heckman et al., 1999): 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 | 0 1 = = − = = i i i i i ITT T T Y T Y E τ ,             (4.1) 
where  [] . E  is the expectation function. 
However, we cannot observe the same household in both states (participating and not 
participating) at same time. Thus we may assume that the outcome in the absence of 
treatment is orthogonal between the treatment and comparison groups. This can be assumed 
if the treatment is randomly assigned. Otherwise, a weaker condition, in which the conditional 
outcome in the absence of treatment is orthogonal to the treatment assignment, should be 
assumed: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i X T Y T Y T | 1 , 0 = = ⊥ ,               (4.2) 
where  i X  is a vector of observable characteristics. This assumption implies that, given  i X , the 
other unobservable variables, say  i Z , which determine the treatment assignment,  i T , are 
orthogonal to the conditional outcome,  i i i T X Y , | . Thus conditioning on i X , one can consistently 
estimate the ITT parameter by comparing the outcomes of treatment and comparison groups 
(Rubin, 1978; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
On the other hand, the ITT estimate will be a consistent estimator for the ATT effect only if 
the treatment assignment, or intention of treatment, is perfectly correlated with the actual 
treatment. Thus even when condition (4.2) of selection on observables holds, we should also 
assume that there are no contamination or externality effects spilling over onto the control group, 
no alternative treatment offered to the control group, and no drop-out from the treatment group 
(Heckman et al., 1999; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and 
Halloran, 2008). This assumption is what Rubin (1980, 1986) calls Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value 
Assumption (SUTVA). 
In the case of CCT programmes, drop-out from the treatment group is not a large problem 
because usually there are very few households that do not accept the benefit. Non-compliance 
with the conditionalities is a more common problem, but its effect is implicit when one evaluates a 
programme’s effectiveness. Neither is the existence of alternative treatment a significant problem, 
since its beneficiaries are usually either included in the treatment group or excluded from the 
sample. 
Externality of the treatment, however, is indeed an issue to be considered, for two reasons. 
The first is the contamination of the control group, which can bias the ATT estimates. If we did not  
distinguish the comparison group between those living in treated communities and those living in 
other communities, the SUTVA would be violated—that is, the comparison group would be 
contaminated by households that have also been affected by the programme. The second reason 
for estimating externality is the interest in assessing its effect, in order to gain a better 
understanding of the role of social interactions in the programme’s effectiveness. 
4.1.1 Assessing Participation and Externality Effects 
In order to identify and disentangle the externality effect, we need to distinguish between the 
two comparison groups: those in treated communities and those in untreated communities.  
Let  1 = i D  indicate that household i living in the area where the programme took place, and 
0 = i D  otherwise. Thus, ( ) 0 , 1 = = i i T D  indicates the “within-community” comparison group, while 
( ) 0 , 0 = = i i T D  indicates the “between-community” comparison group. For all treated households, 
i D  is certainly equal to one, which leads to( ) 1 , 1 = = i i T D . Note that there is no treated household 
in untreated communities,  ( ) 1 , 0 = = i i T D , but this counterfactual case is estimated under some 
identification assumptions. 
An underling assumption is that externalities only take place in communities participating in 
the programme—that is, there is no spillover between communities. Then the average 
participation effect on the treated (APT), which represents the effect of the programme when 
there is no externality, is given by:
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( ) ( ) [ ] 1 | 0 , 0 1 , 0 = = = − = = = i i i i i i i p T T D Y T D Y E τ ,          (4.3) 
whereas the average externality effect on the treated (AET), which represents only the effect of 
the externalities promoted by the programme, is given by: 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 | 0 , 0 0 , 1 = = = − = = = i i i i i i i e T T D Y T D Y E τ .            (4.4) 
We can represent the outcome by the following linear function: 
( ) i i e i p i i i D T T D Y ε τ τ α + + + = , .                (4.5) 
This function form assumes that there is no specific effect stemming from the interaction between 
participation and externality. That is, the externality effect is equal in both cases when the 
household is treated and when it is untreated; likewise, the participation  effect is the same 
regardless of the existence of externalities. This assumption facilitates the decomposition of the 
ATT effect, because it implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 0 , 1 1 , 0 1 , 1 = = − = = + = = = = = i i i i i i i i i i i i T D Y T D Y T D Y T D Y .    (4.6) 
Moreover, it seems to be more reasonable than the assumption that the externality effect on the 
treatment group is null. 
Then the ATT effect, which represents the total effect of the programme on treated 
households, is given by the sum of both effects (4.3) and (4.4). Using (4.6) we can write it as: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ], 1 0 , 0 1 , 1
1
0 , 0 0 , 1
0 , 0 1 , 0








= = − = = +
= = − = =
=
+ =
i i i i i i i
i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
p e ATT
T T D Y T D Y E
T
T D Y T D Y
T D Y T D Y
E
τ τ τ
          (4.7) 
                                                 
18. The APT parameter can also be interpreted as an ITT parameter.    
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One condition for the identification of these effects is the following orthogonally assumption: 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i D X T Y T Y T , | 1 , 0 = = ⊥ .                (4.8) 
It means that the treatment assignment and the potential outcomes are independent conditional 
on the pre-treatment observed variables,  i X , and the community,  i D . 
Similarly, we should also assume that the community choice is orthogonal to the potential 
outcomes conditioned on the observed variables,  i X , and the  household treatment 
assignment,  i T : 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i T X D Y D Y D , | 1 , 0 = = ⊥ .               (4.9) 
 
Since one actually only observes  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 1 0 , 1 1 1 , 1 = = ⋅ − + = = ⋅ ⋅ − + = = ⋅ = i i i i i i i i i i i i i i T D Y D T D Y D T T D Y T Y , 
assumptions (4.8) and (4.9) are required to guarantee a consistent approximation of the 
counterfactual, missing, potential outcomes, and then make the following equalities hold: 
[ ] [ ] 0 , 1 , | 1 , 1 , | = = − = = = i i i i i i i i p T D X Y E T D X Y E τ ,          (4.10) 
[ ] [ ] 0 , 0 , | 0 , 1 , | = = − = = = i i i i i i i i e T D X Y E T D X Y E τ , and        (4.11) 
[ ] [ ] 0 , 0 , | 1 , 1 , | = = − = = = i i i i i i i i ATT T D X Y E T D X Y E τ .          (4.12) 
 
One way to obtain those estimators is approximating the conditional means by estimating the 
following linear function (Rubin, 1977):
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( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] . 1 | 1 | 3 2
1 0
i i i i i i i i i
i i e i p i
D T X E X T T X E X
X D T Y
ε α α
α τ τ α
+ ⋅ = − ′ + ⋅ = − ′ +
′ + + + =
       (4.13) 
However, if the dimension of  i X   is too large and some critical covariates are possibly 
correlated with the errors in the equations above, it may be difficult to estimate this regression 
function accurately. 
The well-known solution to control for treatment selection on many observable characteristics 
is to reduce the set of covariates,  i X , to a scalar by means of a first-stage estimation. That is, we 
can estimate a propensity score,  ( ) [ ] i i i X T P X p | 1 = = , which represents the probability of 
household i being treated conditional on  i X . Given assumption (4.2), treatment assignment,  i T , 
and the potential outcomes,  ( ) i i T Y , will also be independent conditional on  ( ) i X p  (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). 
The implementation of the propensity score, however, requires an additional assumption: 
( ) i i i i i X x T X p x ∈ ∀ ⊥ | .                  (4.14) 
This assumption is called the “balancing property” and can be empirically verified. Yet in the case 
of distinct comparison groups or multiple treatments, the balancing property is not as simple as 
                                                 
19. According to Rubin (1977), under similar assumptions, one can obtain estimates for other parameters, such as the 
average effect of treatment (ATE) and the average effect of treatment on the untreated (ATU), only changing the 
conditioning of the expectations in equation 4.13.  
the conventional (Lechner, 2001). The treatment group must be balanced to both the within-
community comparison group and the between-community comparison group. 
Moreover, condition (4.9) requires that we estimate not only the probability of each unit 
sample being treated but also the probabilities of belonging to the between-  and within-
community comparison groups. These probabilities can be estimated using a multinomial or 
multivariate regression model, where the probability of being in within-community comparison 
group,  ( ) [ ] i i i i X T D P X e | 0 , 1 = = = , is also calculated. 
In the second stage, adjusting for the propensity score removes the bias associated with 
differences in the observed covariates in the treated and comparison groups (Heckman et. al., 
1997; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). One approach, based on Horvitz and Thompson’s (1952) 
theorem, consists of weighting treated and comparison observations to make them representative 
of the population of interest—in our case, the treatment group (Hahn, 1998; Hirano et al., 2003). 
In this approach, we characterise  p τ ,  e τ   and  ATT τ   through the following moment equations, 
respectively: 
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X p E τ ,          (4.17) 
where  ( ) [ ] i i i X T E X p | =   is the probability of being in the treatment group and 
( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i X D T E X e | 1 ⋅ − =  is the probability of being in the within-community comparison group. 
Given the estimators  ( ) i X p ˆ   and  ( ) i X e ˆ , which can be calculated using  a multinomial 
probabilistic model,  p τ ,  e τ  and  ATT τ  are estimated by setting the sample moments equal to zero, 
leading to the estimators: 
( ) ( )
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1 ˆ τ .  (4.20) 
As Robins and Rotnizky (1995) point out, if either the model of conditional means (4.13) or 
the model based on the propensity score (4.15)–(4.17) are correctly specified, the resulting 
estimator will be consistent. For this reason, Hirano and Imbens (2001) propose a flexible 
approach combining both models. Hirano and Imbens’s estimator is based on weighted least 
square estimation of equation (4.13), where the control variables on the right-hand side are a 
subset of  i X .
20 Based on the estimators (4.18)–(4.20), the estimated weight, applied in these 
regressions, is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
















1 , , ˆ
− −
− + ⋅ − + = ω ,        (4.21) 
where  i Z  is a subset of  i X  that balances both propensities scores. 
4.1.2 Assessing Income Effect and Behavioural-Change Effects 
Besides looking at the externality effect, this paper also proposes a methodology to disentangle 
the effects of increasing income and the changes induced by behavioural change. Essentially, 
we propose to decompose each of the APT, AET and ATT parameters into income effect, 
substitution effect and unexplained effect, using a methodology analogous to those presented 
by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), and Firpo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (2007). The income effect represents the change in the outcome,  i Y , predicted by the 
income expansion path when the household income increases. The substitution effect 
represents the effect of changes in the income expansion path on the outcome. That is, given 
the same level of income, this component assesses the effect of change in the income elasticity 
promoted by the programme. The unexplained component represents the effect of the 
programme that is related to neither the income level nor the income elasticity. This component 
measures an autonomous change in the outcome caused by the programme. Then the sum of 
the two latter components represents the behavioural-change effect—that is, the component 
that is not explained by the income increase. 
In order to simplify, let  ( ) 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 i i i i Y T D Y = = = ,  ( ) 0 , 1 , 0 , 1 i i i i Y T D Y = = = , and 
( ) 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 i i i i Y T D Y = = = . Then, consider the outcome  T D i Y , ,  as a function of the income level of 
household i,  T D i W , , , as follows: 
( ) T D i T D i T D T D i u W g Y , , , , , , , + = ,                 (4.22) 
where  ( ) . ., ,T D g  is a nonparametric function and  T D i u , ,  represents the unobservable component. 
As in Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, it is useful to think of  T D i u , ,  as two components: the percentile of 
                                                 
20. Wooldridge (2002 and 2007) demonstrate the properties of this approach for M estimation in general.  
household i in the distribution of errors,  i θ , and the distribution function of the errors,  () . ,T D F . 
Then we have  ( ) i T D T D i F u θ
1
, , ,
− = . 
Define  ( ) . ., g   as a counterfactual function and  () . F   as the counterfactual cumulative 
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Note that the functions  ( ) . ., g  and  () . F  are the same for both the treatment and comparison 
groups. Then 
W
T D i Y , ,  have the same distribution in all groups if and only if  T D i W , ,  have the same 
distribution. Thus the difference between household i and its counterfactual in terms of 
W
T D i Y , ,  
results only from income variation. The outcome 
g
T D i Y , , , on the other hand, maintains the function 
() . F   constant but lets the function  ( ) .,. ,T D g   be distinct across groups. Then the difference 
between household i and its counterfactual results from both income variation and change in 




i W g W g Y Y − = − . 
Thus the only thing that changes is the income expansion path,  ( ) .,. ,T D g . Finally, the distribution 
of 
u




T D F . 
From (4.23), we can rewrite the ATT parameter (4.12) as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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= − + − + − =
       (4.24) 
where 
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is the total income effect of the programme on the treated, 
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is the total substitution effect of the programme on the treated, and    
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is the total unexplained effect of the programme on the treated. 
Likewise, the APT and AET parameters can be written respectively as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
and   ,                                                                    
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        (4.25) 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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= − + − + − =
         (4.26) 
where 
W
p τ , 
g
p τ   and 
u
p τ   are respectively the income, substitution and unexplained effects of 
participation in the programme on the treated; and 
W
e τ , 
g
e τ  and 
u
e τ  are respectively the income, 
substitution and unexplained effects of externalities of the programme on the treated. 
In order to estimate all these parameters, the first step is to obtain an estimate for the 
function  1 , 1 g , as well as for its counterfactuals,  0 , 1 g  and  0 , 0 g . Note that when we are interested in 
decomposing the effect on the treated,  0 , 0 g  does not represent the income expansion path of the 
between-community comparison group. It actually represents a counterfactual function for the 
treatment group if the programme were not implemented. Likewise,  0 , 1 g   represents a 
counterfactual function for the treatment group if the programme were implemented but the 
households were not intended to be treated. 
 
It is worth mentioning that this decomposition approach is quite sensitive to the choice of 
( ) . ., g . For instance, if one chooses  ( ) ( ) .,. . ., 0 , 0 g g =  to decompose the ATT parameter,  ATT τ , it will 
be implicitly assumed that the income effect comes earlier than the substitution effect. Then the 
income effect would be measured given the ex-ante behaviour, while the substitution effect would 
be measured given that the transfer was already made. With  ( ) ( ) .,. . ., 1 , 1 g g = , 
g
ATT τ   would 
represent the substitution effect before the transfer. To avoid this arbitrary assumption on what 
comes first, we could define different  ( ) . ., g  for each component so that it represents the marginal 
effect of the component, given the others unchanged.
21 In this case, however, the equalities 
(4.24), (4.25) and (4.26) would not hold any longer. Another way to avoid being arbitrary and also 
to make these equalities hold is to define  ( ) . ., g  as an average function, say  ( ) . ., a g , as in the 
Shapley decomposition of income distribution (Kakwani, 2000). 
Under assumptions (4.8) and (4.9), along with the balancing property condition,  ( ) . ., ,T D g  and 
() . ,T D F  can be consistently estimated by weighted Kernel regressions for each group separately, 
where the weight is given by (4.21). The average functions,  ( ) . ., a g  and  () . a F , are also estimated 
by weighted Kernel regressions, but without distinguishing the groups. 
The second step is to estimate 
W
T D i Y , , , which is the predicted outcome under  ( ) . ., g , given the 
observed  T D i W , , . Then we estimate the ATT, APT and AET effects, as previously described, on 
                                                 
21. In this case, the income component can be called marginal income effect (MIE).  
the outcome 
W
T D i Y , ,  to get estimates for 
W
ATT τ , 
W
p τ  and 
W
e τ , respectively. In order to obtain the 
estimates for 
g
ATT τ , 
g
p τ  and 
g
e τ , we first calculate the estimated value of 
g
T D i Y , , , which is the 
difference between the predicted outcomes under  ( ) . ., ,T D g  and  ( ) . ., g . Then we estimate the 
respective effect on 
g
T D i Y , ,  and subtract the estimated income effect from this. Finally, to obtain the 
estimates for 
u
ATT τ , 
u
p τ  and 
u
e τ , we subtract the respective estimated income and substitution 
effects from the estimated ATT. 
Since all components are estimated using predicted variables, estimation of the standard 
errors is not straightforward. It requires a correction as suggested by Schafer and Schenker 
(1997). Since standard errors for estimates based on propensity score are likewise not 
straightforward, we opt to calculate all the standard errors using a nonparametric bootstrap, with 
samples taken independently within each group. It is worth mentioning that once a new sample is 
drawn, all the steps in the decomposition are repeated, including the Kernel regressions. The only 
step that is not repeated after resampling is the estimation of the propensity score. 
4.2 ESTIMATING the Multinomial Propensity Score 
As already mentioned, since there are two distinct comparison groups, we should estimate a 
multinomial propensity score that balances the covariates between the treatment and 
comparison groups. Such an assumption can actually be tested, checking whether the 
differences in observable characteristics between groups are significant after the propensity 
score weighting. Once the differences are not significant, it does not matter which link 
function we use. 
In this paper, the propensity score of “multiple” treatment is obtained using a multinomial 
logistic model as suggested by Lechner (2001), which yields the estimated probability of 
being in each group. Table 3  presents the estimated coefficients of this model. The 
covariates, as well as their interactions, are chosen with the aim of satisfying the balancing 
property for a larger set of pre-treatment variables. This set, obtained from the Ficha Hogar, 
includes all components of the ICV (the official targeting index) and other variables not 
considered in the calculation of that index, such as department and area (urban/rural) of 
residence, possession of identity card by some household members, number of years living in 
the same neighbourhood, number of household members, sex of household head, and per 










  coef.  std. err.    coef.  std. err.   
Department of San Pedro  -2.4361  0.9267 
*** 0.2278  0.7516 
 
Rural area  -0.3385  0.3310 
  -0.0795  0.3555 
 
Possession of ID  -0.1366  0.2826 
  -0.7138  0.2391 
*** 
Years in the neighbourhood  0.0136  0.0086 
  0.0245  0.0078 
*** 
Number of members  -0.4646  0.2996 
  -0.4168  0.2534 
* 
Squared number of members 0.0229  0.0158 
  0.0273  0.0130 
** 
Female household head  -0.2980  0.2596 
  -0.1366  0.2309 
 
Per capita income  0.0000  0.0000 
  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Squared per capita income  0.0000  0.0000 
  0.0000  0.0000 
 
ICV(c) – number of children  -0.1892  0.5135 
  0.0687  0.4600 
 
ICV(h) – health condition  0.7695  0.2769 
*** 0.0399  0.2259 
 
ICV(e) – education  0.1724  0.0556 
*** -0.0869  0.0555 
 
ICV(w) – employment  -0.5305  0.7653 
  -1.1150  0.7340 
 
ICV(h) – housing condition  0.0453  0.0529 
  -0.2482  0.0537 
*** 
ICV(s) – public services  0.4953  0.1427 
*** 0.0132  0.1266 
 
ICV(a) – asset ownership  0.1701  0.0483 
*** 0.0578  0.0511 
 
HH members x ICV(c)   0.0190  0.0680 
  -0.0285  0.0580 
 
Department x ICV(h)  0.4290  0.2718 
  0.1309  0.2304 
 
ICV(w) x ICV(h)  0.1163  0.2037 
  0.3014  0.1983 
 
ICV(h) x ICV(s)  -0.1096  0.0417 
*** -0.0097  0.0380 
 
ICV(s) x ICV(h)  0.0099  0.0063 
  0.0226  0.0061 
*** 
Intercept  -4.3709  1.8106 
**  1.3913  1.5158 
  
Number of observations  1,093  Log likelihood  -778.09 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
On the basis of the estimated propensity score, we restrict the “weighted” or “matched” 
sample to those households within a common support. This common support is defined by the 
probability of being in each of the three groups between 1 per cent and 98 per cent. 
Table 4 presents the mean of covariates for each group before and after the propensity 
score weighting. For all variables, there is at least one group that is significantly different from 
another. After the propensity score weighting and restriction to the common support, however, the 
differences almost disappear in terms of mean. The only significant differences that remain are in 
the department of residence and in the number of children, health and education components of 
the ICV. For this reason, these variables are also included in the regression adjustment—that is 
on the right-hand side of equation (4.13). 
  
TABLE 4 
Estimated Coefficient of Multinomial Propensity Score 




With PS weighting  mean  std. err.  mean  std. err.   mean  std. err.    
Department of San Pedro  0.4444  0.0280  0.4049  0.0237 
  0.6727  0.0252 
*** ''' 
Rural area  0.8801  0.0183  0.5409  0.0241 
*** 0.8062  0.0213 
*** ''' 
Possession of ID  0.8662  0.0192  0.8591  0.0168 
  0.7525  0.0232 
*** ''' 
Years in the neighbourhood 11.154  0.6216  11.878  0.6459 
  14.209  0.8075 
*** '' 
Number of members  6.1206  0.1338  5.1761  0.1010 
*** 6.2555  0.1477 
  ''' 
Female household head  0.2539  0.0245  0.1891  0.0189 
**  0.2036  0.0216 
   
Per capita income  36357.5  2608.1  125724.2 7962.3 
*** 78041.0  6153.1 
*** ''' 
ICV – number of children  1.6380  0.0387  1.9190  0.0247 
*** 1.6476  0.0390 
  ''' 
ICV – health condition  3.1180  0.0459  3.3759  0.0432 
*** 3.2850  0.0452 
***  
ICV – education  3.7306  0.0974  5.7939  0.1399 
*** 3.6756  0.1194 
  ''' 
ICV – employment  0.3119  0.0287  0.7791  0.0493 
*** 0.3860  0.0352 
  ''' 
ICV – housing condition  8.7593  0.1975  15.0191  0.2758 
*** 9.4192  0.2815 
*  ''' 
ICV – public services  4.6874  0.1350  9.3792  0.2275 
*** 6.5461  0.2010 
*** ''' 
ICV – asset ownership  1.0051  0.1015  3.1119  0.1205 
*** 1.6271  0.1179 
*** ''' 
ICV – total  23.250  0.3773  39.378  0.6335 
*** 26.587  0.6095 
*** ''' 
Number of observations  331     521    
   322    
     
Without PS weighting  mean  std. err.  mean  std. err. 
   mean  std. err. 
     
Department of San Pedro  0.4218  0.0287  0.5293  0.0252 
*** 0.4841  0.0284 
   
Rural area  0.8755  0.0192  0.9093  0.0145 
  0.9022  0.0169 
   
Possession of ID  0.8781  0.0190  0.8781  0.0165 
  0.8544  0.0201 
   
Years in the neighbourhood 11.387  0.6426  11.649  0.5626 
  12.379  0.7270 
   
Number of members  6.0608  0.1354  5.9958  0.1230 
  6.1228  0.1382 
   
Female household head  0.2535  0.0253  0.2177  0.0208 
  0.2187  0.0235 
   
Per capita income  36858.9  2718.5  39219.0  2482.6 
  35390.9  2381.8 
   
ICV – number of children  1.6747  0.0385  1.7387  0.0304 
  1.6512  0.0401 
  ' 
ICV – health condition  3.1971  0.0436  3.2735  0.0342 
  3.1018  0.0403 
  ''' 
ICV – education  3.7807  0.1019  3.6950  0.0956 
  3.5589  0.0863 
*   
ICV – employment  0.3186  0.0300  0.2587  0.0317 
  0.2781  0.0305 
   
ICV – housing condition  8.9901  0.2002  8.7195  0.1658 
  9.1095  0.2333 
   
ICV – public services  4.8544  0.1365  4.9600  0.1288 
  4.6809  0.1433 
   
ICV – asset ownership  1.0702  0.1070  0.9480  0.0885 
  1.0772  0.1017 
   
ICV – total  23.886  0.3695  23.593  0.3089 
   23.458  0.3854 
     
Number of observations  297     394       310          
Note: 
***  signif. different from treatment at 1%, 
**  signif. different from treatment at 5%, 
*  signif. different from 
treatment at 10%. ''' signif. different from W-C comparison at 1%, '' signif. different from W-C comparison at 5%, ' 
signif. different from W-C comparison at 10%. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the propensity score weighting changes the distribution of the ICV for 
the comparison groups. In the panel on the left with the unweighted distributions, the comparison 
groups’ distributions have a longer right tail than the treatment group’s: the probability of higher 
ICV values is greater in the comparison groups, mainly in the within-community group. The panel 
on the right shows how the weighting scheme changes the ICV distribution of the comparison 
groups so that it resembles the distribution of the treatment group. The weighting scheme thus 
approximates the groups not only in terms of means, as shown in Table 4, but also in terms of the 

























The ICV is actually the main determinant of participation in the Tekoporã programme, and no 
significant difference between the treated and untreated groups is found after the propensity 
score weighting. Thus we can assume conditions (4.8) and (4.9) of selection of households 
based on observables and achieve consistent results. With regard to the adequacy of propensity 
score methods to evaluate CCT programmes, Handa and Diaz (2006) and Handa and Maluccio 
(2010) show that these methods are capable of reproducing the experimental results for the 
cases of PROGRESA and RPS, respectively, even in a non-experimental setting.
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5 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section is divided into three parts. The first presents descriptive statistics for the treatment 
group, the within-community comparison group and the between-community comparison group. 
The second encompasses  the estimates of Tekoporã’s average effect (ATT), participation 
effect (APT), and externality effect (AET) on consumption. The third shows the estimated 
decompositions of these three effects into income, substitution and unexplained effects. 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE Statistics 
The decompositions proposed in this paper are applied to investigate the effect of the Tekoporã 
programme on household consumption and expenditures. In particular, we estimate the effect 
on total expenditures on consumption, expenditures on food, and the saving rate. Expenditures, 
                                                 
22. Note that our quasi-experimental data, unlike the non-experimental approach of Handa and Diaz (2006) and Handa 
and Maluccio (2010), comes from the same instrument. Thus it is in line with the best practices regarding the use of 
propensity score methods—namely, the same questionnaire, comparison group from the same socioeconomic 
environment, and data collected in the same period for both groups (Heckman et al., 1997).  
which include self-production and other non-monetary expenditures, are measured by logarithm 
of the per capita amount. The saving rate is defined as the difference between the logarithms of 
monthly net income and expenditures on consumption (Deaton, 1997)—that is, the proportion 
of income in cash and in kind, discounting taxes and transfers to others, that a household 
receives more (or less) than its expenditures on consumption. We also estimate the effect on 
consumption basket composition, assessed by the share of consumption spent on distinct 
items—for example, the shares of expenditures on food, education, health, child clothing, adult 
clothing and housing.
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Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for those outcome variables post-treatment.
24 Note 
that the total consumption level, as well as food consumption, is about 9 per cent higher in the 
comparison groups. The saving rate, on the other hand, is much higher in the treatment group 
than in the other groups. Current income in the treated households is almost 3 per cent higher 
than their consumption, whereas the comparison households spend on average more than they 
earn. Moreover, the mean saving rate in the within-community comparison group is significantly 
higher than in the other comparison group, which cannot be affected by the programme in any 
way. 
TABLE 5 
Descriptive Analysis of Outcomes 




   mean  std. err.  mean  std. err.   mean  std. err.    
log per capita consumption 11.6545  0.03401  11.7385  0.02719 
*  11.7628  0.03352 
**  
log pc food consumption  11.4236  0.03867  11.5231  0.02656 
**  11.5141  0.03279 
*   
saving rate  0.02970  0.03532  -0.13635 0.03775 
*** -0.28521  0.04339 
*** ''' 
share of food expenditures 0.81731  0.00922  0.82262  0.00789 
  0.79784  0.00850 
  '' 
share of education exp.  0.01032  0.00260  0.00701  0.00138 
  0.01072  0.00232 
   
share of health exp.  0.03643  0.00463  0.04203  0.00402 
  0.03703  0.00481 
   
share of child clothing exp. 0.02876  0.00290  0.01484  0.00173 
*** 0.01619  0.00177 
***  
share of adult clothing exp. 0.00996  0.00207  0.00584  0.00106 
*  0.01286  0.00192 
  ''' 
share of housing exp.  0.05100  0.00352  0.04536  0.00256 
  0.05877  0.00351 
  ''' 
Number of observations  297     394       310          
Note: 
***  signif. different from treatment at 1%, 
**  signif. different from treatment at 5%, 
*  signif. different from 
treatment at 10%. ''' signif. different from W-C comparison at 1%, '' signif. different from W-C comparison at 5%, ' 
signif. different from W-C comparison at 10%. 
Although mean food consumption is greater in the comparison group, its mean food share 
does not differ significantly from the treatment group’s. Among households in this sample, about 
80 per cent of spending is on food. The mean food share in the within-community comparison 
group, though, is significantly greater than in the between-community group. The shares of adult 
clothing and housing expenditures in the latter group, on the other hand, are significantly higher 
than in the former comparison group. On average, among these households about 5 per cent of 
spending is on housing and 1 per cent on adult clothing. The mean share of child clothing is also 
around 1 per cent in the comparison groups. In the treatment group, however, this mean share is 
almost 3 per cent. Finally, households in the three groups spend about 1 per cent on education 
and 4 per cent on health. 
                                                 
23. The effect of the programme on expenditure level and composition can only be interpreted as an effect on 
consumption level and composition if the programme has not affected local prices. Ribas (2008) shows that the Tekoporã 
has had no significant effect on food prices, considered as the most sensitive to shocks in aggregate demand. These 
results are available on request. 
24. The Ficha Hogar, used as a baseline, lacks information on household consumption. Thus we observe those outcomes 
only after the programme took place.    
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5.2 PARTICIPATION, Externality and Total Effects of Tekoporã 
Table  6  presents the estimates for the average participation effect on the treated (APT), 
average externality effect on the treated (AET), and average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), which is the sum of the former effects. If the programme had no externality effect, it 
would increase the level of consumption by 21 per cent, food consumption by 15 per cent, and 
by 0.7 percentage points the share of adult clothing among treated households. But the 
externality effects of the programme on these outcomes are all negative. Hence the externality 
cancels out the participation effect, making the total effect of the programme on these 
outcomes null or even negative, as on food consumption. Likewise, the programme would 
reduce the share of food consumption by 4 percentage points in the absence of externality. 
Nonetheless, given the small externality effect on this outcome, the total effect of the 
programme on the food share of treated households is insignificant.  
TABLE 6 
Estimated APT, AET and ATT on Household Consumption 
  APT 
  AET 
  ATT 
 
log per capita consumption 0.21106 
***  -0.29765 
***  -0.08659 
  
  (0.07504) 
  (0.08055) 
  (0.05464) 
 
log pc food consumption  0.14844 
**  -0.26999 
***  -0.12155 
** 
  (0.07506) 
  (0.07896) 
  (0.06081) 
 
saving rate  0.15757 
**  0.14956 
*  0.30713 
*** 
  (0.07402) 
  (0.08785) 
  (0.07347) 
 
share of food expenditures -0.03944 
**  0.02197 
  -0.01747 
 
  (0.01549) 
  (0.01612) 
  (0.01409) 
 
share of education exp.  0.00592 
*  -0.00282 
  0.00310 
 
  (0.00341) 
  (0.00354) 
  (0.00404) 
 
share of health exp.  0.00405 
  0.00788 
  0.01193 
* 
  (0.00765) 
  (0.00686) 
  (0.00645) 
 
share of child clothing exp. 0.01504 
***  0.00316 
  0.01819 
*** 
  (0.00403) 
  (0.00327) 
  (0.00332) 
 
share of adult clothing exp. 0.00678 
***  -0.01005 
***  -0.00326 
 
  (0.00222) 
  (0.00284) 
  (0.00345) 
 
share of housing exp.  0.00891 
  -0.00987 
  -0.00096 
 
   (0.00662) 
   (0.00716) 
   (0.00571) 
  
Note: 
*** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
Standard errors, between parentheses, calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. 
 
Even though the participation effect on food consumption is positive, the negative 
participation effect on food share is explained by a higher increase in other types of 
expenditure, such as on child and adult clothing. Unlike the effect on share of adult clothing, the 
participation effect on share of child clothing is not offset by the externality effect, which makes 
the total effect on this outcome about 18 percentage points. 
An externality effect that boosts the participation effect is on savings. Each component 
contributes about 50 per cent to the total impact of the programme on the saving rate, which is at 
31 per cent. The positive externality on savings explains why the externality on consumption is 
negative. The programme encourages an increase in the saving rate even if the household was 
not being treated but was in a treated community. This externalised behaviour makes households 
reduce consumption in order to save more of their income. 
5.3 INCOME Effect and Behavioural Change Effects of Tekoporã 
To understand the previous results better, we can also decompose those effects into income 
effect, substitution effect and unexplained effect. In the tables in this section, the first column  
shows the estimated marginal income effect (MIE), which is the impact that the programme 
would have if it only caused an increase in household income. This effect represents the impact 
of the programme if it were unconditional and did not have other components besides income 
transfer. The next column presents the income effect (IE) taking into consideration that the 
income expansion path has also been changing—that is, it gives the contribution of income 
increase per se to the programme impact. The third column shows the substitution effect (SE), 
which is the contribution of changes in income elasticity, taking into account that household 
income has been increasing. The last column presents the unexplained effect (UE), which is 
the contribution of changes that are not related to either income level or elasticity. 
TABLE 7 
Estimated Decomposition of the APT on Household Consumption 
   MIE 
  IE 
  SE 
  UE 
  
log per capita consumption 0.13117 
*** 0.12365 
*** 0.06970 
   0.01771 
  
  (0.0356) 
  (0.0389) 
  (0.0689) 
  (0.0292) 
 
log pc food consumption  0.13635 
*** 0.13207 
*** 0.00384 
  0.01254 
 
  (0.0372) 
  (0.0377) 
  (0.0700) 
  (0.0300) 
 
saving rate  0.17906 
*** 0.15358 
*** 0.02963 
  -0.02564 
 
  (0.0453) 
  (0.0383) 
  (0.0700) 
  (0.0314) 
 
share of food expenditures 0.00161 
  0.00108 
  -0.03329 
** -0.00722 
 
  (0.0038) 
  (0.0028) 
  (0.0156) 
  (0.0082) 
 
share of education exp.  -0.00064 
  -0.00093 
  0.00503 
  0.00181 
 
  (0.0011) 
  (0.0006) 
  (0.0033) 
  (0.0015) 
 
share of health exp.  -0.00244 
  -0.00038 
  0.00251 
  0.00191 
 
  (0.0023) 
  (0.0011) 
  (0.0078) 
  (0.0034) 
 
share of child clothing exp. -0.00009 
  0.00010 
  0.01312 
*** 0.00181 
 
  (0.0006) 
  (0.0007) 
  (0.0042) 
  (0.0019) 
 
share of adult clothing exp. 0.00091 
  0.00021 
  0.00598 
*** 0.00060 
 
  (0.0012) 
  (0.0008) 
  (0.0022) 
  (0.0008) 
 
share of housing exp.  0.00052 
  0.00098 
  0.00644 
  0.00149 
 
   (0.0017) 
   (0.0014) 
   (0.0069) 
   (0.0032) 
  
Note: 
*** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. Standard errors, between parentheses calculated 
using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = 
Unexplained Effect. 
Table  7  presents the estimated decomposition of the average participation effect (APT). 
Assuming that the programme would have no externality, its effects on consumption and savings 
would be wholly explained by the income increase. The effects on consumption composition, on 
the other hand, are entirely explained by changes in the income elasticity. If there were no 
interaction between households, therefore, an unconditional transfer would cause the same 
increase in household consumption and savings as the programme did. Unlike the programme, 
however, this unconditional transfer would cause no significant change in the consumption basket 
composition. 
Table 8 presents the estimated decomposition of the AET. As expected, the externality of the 
programme is not caused by its transfer, but by the behavioural change that it promotes. 
According to the method of decomposition, the income effect would be externalised if the transfer 
had a multiplicative effect on the community. Hence we can state that the cash transfer by itself 




Estimated Decomposition of the AET on Household Consumption 
   MIE 
  IE 
  SE 
  UE 
 
log per capita consumption -0.04896 
   -0.04936 
   -0.22560 
***  -0.02270 
  
  (0.0352) 
  (0.0386) 
  (0.0768) 
  (0.0331) 
 
log pc food consumption  -0.05275 
  -0.05292 
  -0.19707 
***  -0.02000 
 
  (0.0366) 
  (0.0394) 
  (0.0759) 
  (0.0334) 
 
saving rate  -0.07443 
  -0.05727 
  0.18515 
**  0.02169 
 
  (0.0563) 
  (0.0488) 
  (0.0726) 
  (0.0323) 
 
share of food expenditures -0.00005 
  -0.00071 
  0.02101 
  0.00167 
 
  (0.0028) 
  (0.0021) 
  (0.0170) 
  (0.0096) 
 
share of education exp.  0.00040 
  0.00040 
  -0.00360 
  0.00038 
 
  (0.0007) 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0038) 
  (0.0016) 
 
share of health exp.  0.00166 
  0.00077 
  0.00931 
  -0.00220 
 
  (0.0017) 
  (0.0009) 
  (0.0072) 
  (0.0035) 
 
share of child clothing exp. 0.00010 
  -0.00004 
  0.00332 
  -0.00012 
 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0004) 
  (0.0036) 
  (0.0019) 
 
share of adult clothing exp. -0.00021 
  0.00002 
  -0.01019 
***  0.00012 
 
  (0.0008) 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0028) 
  (0.0011) 
 
share of housing exp.  -0.00046 
  -0.00040 
  -0.00841 
  -0.00106 
 
   (0.0012) 
   (0.0011) 
   (0.0074) 
   (0.0035) 
  
Note: 
*** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. Standard errors, between parentheses calculated using 
1,000 bootstrap resampling. MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = Unexplained 
Effect.   
Table 9 shows the estimates for the ATT decomposition, which can be read as the sum of 
estimates for each outcome and component presented in the previous tables. In terms of 
consumption and saving, the income component, which is mostly related to the effect of 
participation, is positive: the cash transfer per se has a direct positive effect on consumption 
and savings. On the other hand, the programme also has a substitution effect, which is mostly 
related to externalities. It has an effect on household behaviour that indirectly cancels out the 
income effect on consumption and boosts the income effect on savings. 
As shown earlier, the income component contributes to neither the participation effect nor the 
externality effect in terms of expenditure share. Thus it is expected that the programme’s 
identified impact on the share of child clothing expenditures is entirely explained by the 
substitution effect. 
TABLE 9 
Estimated Decomposition of the ATT on Household Consumption 
   MIE 
  IE 
  SE 
  UE 
 
log per capita consumption 0.08221 
***  0.07430 
***  -0.15590 
***  -0.00498 
  
  (0.0279) 
  (0.0287) 
  (0.0501) 
  (0.0215) 
 
log pc food consumption  0.08360 
***  0.07915 
***  -0.19323 
***  -0.00747 
 
  (0.0289) 
  (0.0292) 
  (0.0551) 
  (0.0214) 
 
saving rate  0.10463 
**  0.09631 
**  0.21478 
***  -0.00395 
 
  (0.0454) 
  (0.0405) 
  (0.0542) 
  (0.0269) 
 
share of food expenditures 0.00157 
  0.00037 
  -0.01229 
  -0.00556 
 
  (0.0028) 
  (0.0019) 
  (0.0152) 
  (0.0066) 
 
share of education exp.  -0.00024 
  -0.00052 
  0.00143 
  0.00219 
 
  (0.0006) 
  (0.0004) 
  (0.0040) 
  (0.0015) 
 
share of health exp.  -0.00078 
  0.00039 
  0.01183 
*  -0.00029 
 
  (0.0014) 
  (0.0008) 
  (0.0064) 
  (0.0018) 
 
share of child clothing exp. 0.00001 
  0.00007 
  0.01644 
***  0.00169 
 
  (0.0004) 
  (0.0005) 
  (0.0035) 
  (0.0013) 
 
share of adult clothing exp. 0.00070 
  0.00023 
  -0.00422 
  0.00072 
 
  (0.0009) 
  (0.0007) 
  (0.0034) 
  (0.0010) 
 
share of housing exp.  0.00007 
  0.00058 
  -0.00198 
  0.00043 
 
   (0.0012) 
   (0.0011) 
   (0.0060) 
   (0.0019) 
  
Note: 
*** significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%. 
Standard errors, between parentheses calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. 
MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = Unexplained Effect.  
6 - CONCLUSION 
This paper deals with two relevant issues in discussions of the impacts of CCT programmes. 
First, we discuss the existence of externality and propose to decompose the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) into two components: the average participation effect on the treated 
(APT), which represents the direct impact of the programme; and the average externality effect 
on the treated (AET), which represents the programme’s indirect impact. The expected 
direction and magnitude of the indirect effect are quite pertinent to the decision on programme 
coverage. If the externality has an effect contrary to what is intended, then the higher the 
coverage, the worse the outcomes. Otherwise, a higher coverage would improve the expected 
outcomes.
25 
Second, we decompose those three parameters into income effect, substitution effect and 
unexplained effect. We can then understand whether the programme impact is due either to the 
relaxation of the household budget constraint (like a pure income effect) or to changes in the 
household behaviour triggered by conditionalities and other components of the programme. As 
argued by Handa et al. (2009), conditionalities, as well as other components, are a substantial 
part of the programmes’ budgets and are hard to monitor. They should really contribute to the 
programmes’ impact in order to be justified as a component. 
After applying the suggested methodology, we find that in addition to its direct effects, the 
Tekoporã programme also has indirect effects or externalities. Thus if we did not differentiate the 
comparison group between those living in treated communities and those living in other 
communities, we would violate the Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value Assumption (SUTVA), which, 
according to Rubin (1980, 1986), is required to estimate causal effects. The comparison group 
would be contaminated by households that have also been affected by the programme. 
Furthermore, we show that externalities are entirely associated with changes in household 
behaviour. This suggests that the programme has an indirect effect, not because it has a 
multiplicative effect on aggregate demand, but because there may be a social interaction 
component behind this effect. 
If there were no externality, the programme would increase household consumption 
significantly. This effect, however, is offset by households’ behavioural response to the 
programme. Angelucci and Di Giorgi (2006) find different results in terms of consumption for 
PROGRESA. But they assess externality only for a group of non-eligible households, which 
somehow are able to profit from the extra income in their community. In the case of Tekoporã, the 
role of “family guides” is also worth mentioning. They are meant to help households plan their 
budgets better. In a seasonal, agricultural economy, budget planning means precautionary 
savings. Thus the “saving message” transmitted by the family guides may have spilled over to 
other poor households, causing them to reduce consumption. 
While the impact on savings is caused partly by the increase in income, the impact on 
consumption composition is entirely explained by the behavioural change promoted by the 
programme. In contrast to the finding of Handa et al. (2009), this result suggests that, at least in 
the case of Tekoporã, the cash transfer plays no role in changing the consumption pattern, but 
conditionalities and family guides’ work do. The programme directly encourages beneficiary 
households to reduce relative expenditure on food and increase the share of child and adult 
clothing. Nonetheless, the only effect that remains taking externality into account is on the share 
of child clothing. Because of its other components beyond cash, therefore, the programme is 
effective in improve the share of expenditure going to children. 
                                                 
25. A further study may include externality as a function of coverage and distance to other beneficiaries.  
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